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Abstract: Michael Dummett has long argued that we should 
ascribe implicit knowledge of a meaning-theory to speakers, and 
that the task of a theory of meaning is to tell us what such 
knowledge consists in. But he also sees it as a problem that how 
implicit knowledge is actually used, that is, how a speaker's 
metalinguistic knowledge of a meaning-theory issues or deliv-
ers the speaker's knowledge of meanings of utterances (the de-
livery problem). In this paper I argue that Dummett's instrumen-
tal construal of implicit knowledge does not and cannot solve 
the delivery problem. However, I do not suggest Dummett to 
modify or abandon his instrumental construal; rather, I think he 
can dissolve the delivery problem by recognizing that know-
ledge of semantics for a language is not a necessary condition 
for mastering a language. I shall argue this point through 
Davidson's attitude towards the role of linguistic knowledge 
and his thesis in his (in)famous paper "A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs." 
It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of language and 
linguistics that linguistic competence requires knowledge of a for-
mal semantic theory, such as Davidsonian truth-conditional seman-
tics or Chomskyan linguistic theory. Michael Dummett also sub-
scribes to such a meaning-theoretic account of linguistic compe-
tence.1 He has long argued that we should ascribe (implicit) know-
ledge of a meaning-theory to speakers, and that the task of a 
theory of meaning is to tell us what such knowledge consists in. 
One way to tackle this task is to construct an articulated, correct, 
meaning-theory for a language, on the one hand, and give an ac-
count of the epistemic/cognitive relation mediated between the 
contents of the meaning-theory and a competent speaker of the 
language, on the other. Higginbotham wrote that Dummett dubbed 
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the difficulty of achieving the second part of the task the delivery 
problem for implicit knowledge, namely: "how [implicit] knowledge 
is actually used, that is, by what route it issues in the judgments that 
we make."2 We can have a clear idea of how a meaning-theory 
derives its semantic theorems. But once we put epistemic opera-
tors into consideration, the clearness in theory derivation does not 
transmit to knowledge derivation. For example, we can see how 
Davidson's truth-conditional semantics derives its theorems in the 
form "s is true if an only if p'\ but once we ask how a speaker's 
linguistic knowledge of the meaning of issues from the speaker's 
metalinguistic knowledge of the semantic theorem "s, is true if and 
only if p" and the semantic axioms in the theory's base, we run 
into problems. Most actual speakers do not consciously know any 
theory of language, let alone Davidsonian (or Dummettian) seman-
tics, which are systematic and technical. Some may say that actual 
speakers possess knowledge of semantics implicitly or tacitly. But 
appealing to the notion of implicit or tacit knowledge merely post-
pones the inevitable; the idea of implicit knowledge of semantics 
still requires substantial construal. In his later writings, Dummett 
seems to abandon any hope of appealing to implicit knowledge for 
an explanation of linguistic ability or competence: "[Knowledge 
explains an ability only in so far as it delivers relevant information 
at necessary moments; [but] we have no account of the deliveries 
of such implicit knowledge or of the means of eliciting them."3 But 
this does not imply that the delivery problem is settled. The aim of 
this paper is not to go further to solve the problem on behalf of 
Dummett. Rather, I shall argue, first, that Dummett cannot solve 
the delivery problem, and second, that the delivery problem is a 
pseudo problem-pseudo, if the problem is trying to figure out how 
speakers process (implicitly or explicitly) knowledge of semantics 
in mastering a language and communicating with others. I shall ar-
gue the second point through constructing a thought experiment 
based upon Davidson's discussion of the phenomenon of malaprop-
ism, and my aim is to show that knowledge of formal semantics is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for linguistic compe-
tence and communication. So construed, there is no theoretical rea-
son to pursue the information processing between knowledge of 
semantics and knowledge of meanings of utterances. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In §11 explain why 
Dummett thinks that we should ascribe knowledge of semantics to 
speakers, and the mode of the knowledge is implicit, rather than 
pure theoretical, pure practical, and unconscious. In §2 I explore 
Dummett's substantial account of what implicit knowledge is, which 
I shall call the instrumental construal of implicit knowledge. I argue 
that such construal (and his constraints on the notion of knowledge 
of language) does not and cannot solve the delivery problem. In 
§31 first highlight Davidson's notion of linguistic knowledge, and 
then introduce a thought experiment to show, by discussing the 
phenomenon of malapropism, that knowledge of semantics is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for linguistic competence and com-
munication. In the conclusion I will give my suggestion to Dummett. 
Dummett's Notion of Implicit Knowledge 
There are several hints that speakers have certain linguistic 
knowledge. For example, a native speaker of a natural language L 
can effortlessly intuits grammaticality or acceptability of Z-sen-
tences presented to him. Or, when two different monolingual speak-
ers of, say, English and Chinese are shown simultaneously the same 
sounds of Chinese, both speakers are assumed to have the similar 
auditory perception; however, only one is capable of receiving in-
formation, the other merely noises. To explain these linguistic 
phenomena we accordingly think that a speaker has linguistic know-
ledge of his language. But sometimes the linguistic knowledge that 
a speaker has goes beyond what the speaker himself can conceive 
of. For instance, if a speaker knew the meaning of two sentences 
"a is P* and "b is G", then he is (probably) capable of knowing the 
meaning of a sentence that he had never encountered before, say, 
"b is F" How could this be the case? For theorists of language, it 
is because the speaker implicitly knows the components "a", "6", 
" . . . is F\ and " . . . is G" when he understands "a is F™ and "b is 
G\ and a combination rule. This knowledge, ascribed to the speaker 
by the theorists in explaining his understanding of "b is F\ may be 
unaware of by the speaker himself. The degree of unawareness or 
implicitness would be higher and higher when the theory that the 
theorists ascribe to the speaker becomes more and more complex 
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and technical, such as a Davidsonian meaning-theory (or a 
Chomskyan grammatical theory). From a theorist's point of view, 
speakers cannot understand a language without having knowledge 
of a meaning-theory for that language; in a word, metalinguistic 
knowledge is what the speaker should have (possess, cognize, or 
whatever) when he knows the language. 
Dummett's reason for speakers' having linguistic knowledge 
is rather philosophical. He has long insisted that speech is a ratio-
nal activity. A rational activity, traditionally speaking, distinguishes 
itself from a movement or regularity by its involving intention, mo-
tive, purpose, etc. Dummett elaborates the distinction further by 
saying that: "intention or motive in performing an action is always 
based upon knowledge: it cannot relate to anything the agent did 
not know about the character, significance, or likely effects of the 
action"; on the contrary, a "mere practical ability does not . . . 
provide sufficient grounding for a purpose or intention, because 
one may be able to do something without knowing how one does 
it."4 Speaking a language, as a rational activity, then must have to 
do with knowledge, and such knowledge, in Dummett's construal, 
is and should be conscious in principle. 
Dummett also uses his "speech as a rational activity" thesis to 
support the claim that knowledge of language cannot be pure prac-
tical. In daily lives, when we say that someone can speak a natural 
language, we mean that he knows how to speak that language. But 
for Dummett, "knowing how to speak a language" is not a mere 
idiomatic equivalent of "can speak the language";5 we should take 
"knowing" in the phrase "knowing how to speak a language" seri-
ously. That is, knowing how to speak a language can be distin-
guished from knowing how to swim or ride a bicycle—although they 
all are practical knowledge-by its being an intention-based activity. 
But the further question is: if knowledge of language is not 
pure practical, can it be a kind of propositional knowledge, which 
can be articulated or verbalized? We should notice that here the 
notion "knowledge of language" does not indicate knowledge of 
orthography or a natural language grammar, but knowledge of a 
meaning-theory for a natural language. A speaker may know a lot 
when he knows a language. For example, an illiterate knows how 
to pronounce words, ask questions, make commands, tell lies, etc., 
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although he is unable to read or write. Anormal speaker knows, in 
addition to what the illiterate knows, how to spell words, recognize 
grammatical sentences, etc. A teacher of a given natural language, 
say English, knows more than a normal speaker in her having know-
ledge of English grammar. Knowledge of orthography or a natural 
language grammar can be learnt and then articulated explicitly un-
der appropriate educating and being prompted. However, these 
kinds of linguistic knowledge are not essential in explaining lan-
guage understanding. What interests philosophers most is rather a 
speaker's knowledge of meaning (of utterances), which should be 
pursued through the speaker's metalinguistic knowledge of a mean-
ing-theory (which is capable of deriving meaning-specifications for 
every actual and potential utterances of the speaker). 
Dummett's answer to the question whether knowledge of a 
meaning-theory can be explicit (articulated, or verbalized), is nega-
tive, since he thinks that "it is obvious that the speakers do not in 
general have explicit knowledge of a theory of meaning for their 
language; if they did, there would be no problem about how to 
construct such a theory."6 Such a response, however, merely de-
scribes or states a fact. Dummett goes further to argue that know-
ledge of language cannot be explicit or verbalized by what I shall 
call the argument from dilemma. Assume that a speaker's know-
ledge of a meaning-theory for a language can be taken as an ex-
plicit knowledge, i.e., the speaker can state or code the content of 
the knowledge.7 If the knowledge of a meaning-theory is coded by 
the language that the meaning-theory tries to explain, then the 
mastery of the language is still unexplained. This commits a fallacy 
of vicious circle in explanation.8. If the knowledge of a meaning-
theory is not coded by the language that the meaning-theory tries 
to explain, the knowledge must be coded by a language. This new 
language then needs a meaning-theory as well. But know-ledge of 
this new meaning-theory still needs to be coded by a language. 
This commits a fallacy of infinite regress in explanation.9 There-
fore, if knowledge of a meaning-theory for a language can be coded, 
then the explanation of the full (rather than partial) understanding 
of the language is either circular viciously or regressive ad infini-
tum. To avoid the dilemma, knowledge of a meaning-theory cannot 
be coded or explicit. 
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If we should ascribe knowledge of a meaning-theory to speak-
ers, but the knowledge cannot be articulated, then is it possible that 
the knowledge is unconsciously possessed by the speaker? Crispin 
Wright once gave a neutral description of the relation between the 
content of a meaning-theory and the competence of speakers 
(though his aim is to interpret Dummett): 
[Speakers' competence is subserved by their knowledge, in 
some deep implicit sense, of the contents of such a formal theory: 
they are to be thought of as deploying the information which 
such a theory states in the ways mirrored by the deductive 
articulation of the theory, which is why they are able, for in-
stance, to understand novel utterances which they have never 
heard before.10 
The "information" that a competent speaker deploys could be open 
to interpretation, perhaps psychologically construed. We can psy-
chologize a Davidsonian finitely-axiomatized meaning-theory by 
associating each truth-theoretic axiom with a speaker's subpersonal 
computational mental processes. This suggestion is attractive be-
cause the implicitness of knowledge of the meaning-theory can be 
explained (away) due to its inaccessibility to consciousness, the 
main feature of the subpersonal mental process. Further, the mean-
ing-theory so constructed is empirically grounded, testable, and can 
be determined by empirical evidence if need be. Such a psycho-
logical realist construal of tacit knowledge was proposed by 
Peacocke and Davies respectively;" however, it was not adopted 
by Dummett. For Dummett, "[a] meaning-theory should not. . . 
aspire to be a theory giving a causal account of linguistic utter-
ances, in which human beings figure as natural objects, making 
and reacting to vocal sounds and marks on paper in accordance 
with certain natural laws. We have no need of such a theory."12 
He offers several different arguments against unconscious know-
ledge to be a legitimate notion of knowledge of language.13 But I 
will not pursue these arguments here. Once we accept his "speech 
as a (conscious) rational activity" thesis, it is easy to figure out 
why he refuses to take unconscious cognitive construal of linguis-
tic knowledge. 
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Dummett's Instrumental Construal 
of Implicit Knowledge 
In the preceding section I have explained, following Dummett, 
the reasons why we should ascribe knowledge of language to speak-
ers, and the mode of knowledge of a meaning-theory must be im-
plicit, rather than pure practical, pure theoretical, and unconscious. 
Now the question we are intended to pursue is: What exactly is 
this knowledge? Notice that we are not asking what the content of 
such linguistic knowledge is; this question can be answered rela-
tively easily. For instance, an articulated Davidsonian meaning-
theory with some suitable, substantial, alterations (or to put it straight-
forwardly, an articulated Dummettian verificationist meaning-
theory) could be the option. Rather, we are inquiring into what 
knowledge of language consists w-the question that is ubiqui-
tous in Dummett's writings. To answer this question, we have to 
see how Dummett substantiates the epistemic relation between a 
meaning-theory and a speaker. 
In Dummett's mind, the picture of what a meaning-theory looks 
like, and the structure of the epistemic relation between a mean-
ing-theory and a speaker, can be shown as follows: 
A theory of meaning will... represent the practical ability pos-
sessed by a speaker as consisting in his grasp of a set of propo-
sitions; since the speaker derives his understanding of a sen-
tence from the meanings of its component words, these propo-
sitions will most naturally form a deductively connected sys-
tem. The knowledge of these propositions that is attributed to a 
speaker can only be an implicit knowledge. In general, it cannot 
be demanded of someone who has any given practical ability 
that he have more than an implicit knowledge of those proposi-
tions by means of which we give a theoretical representation of 
that ability.'4 
In his later writing, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett 
expresses a similar view: 
If linguistic competence could be straightforwardly classified as 
a practical ability, we could say . . . that in framing a meaning-
theory we are giving a theoretical representation of a practical 
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ability-the ability to speak the language. We are representing 
this complex ability as consisting in the knowledge of a theory, 
that is, of an articulated structure of propositions. On this ac-
count, we are analyzing a complex of practical abilities by feign-
ing to attribute to one who has these abilities a knowledge of the 
theory.15 
These two passages are the representatives of Dummett's view 
about implicit knowledge of language. There are five points that 
can be derived from the passages: 
(i) The aim of a meaning-theory is to theoretically represent 
a speaker's linguistic competence of, say, understanding 
novel sentences. 
(ii) A meaning-theory is constituted of a set of propositions. 
(iii) A meaning-theory is formed as a deductively connected 
system (such as a Davidsonian, compositional, meaning-
theory). 
(iv) A speaker's practical ability in speaking a language con-
sists in his grasp of a set of proposition exhibited in the 
meaning-theory for that language. 
(v) A speaker's grasp, or knowledge, of these propositions is 
attributed by theorists of language. 
The first three (i-iii) are concerned with a meaning-theory, i.e., 
a meaning-theory's aim, component, and structure, respectively; 
and the remainders (iv and v) are concerned with the relation be-
tween a speaker and a meaning-theory. Among these five points, 
(iii), (iv), and (v) seem to be less controversial; if there is still some-
thing uncomfortable, it is mainly because a vague term is used 
(such as "grasp" in (vi)), or something debatable is presupposed 
(such as the notion of compositionality in (iii)). For me, the real 
controversial issue lies in whether Dummett treats knowledge of 
language as propositional knowledge, as what (ii) shows. I shall 
discuss (ii) through (i). 
In effect, if we force Dummett to reach a decision to locate 
his notion of knowledge of language in either knowledge-that or 
knowledge-how, he will put it, although reluctantly, under, or close 
to, the category of knowledge-how. Straightforwardly speaking, 
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understanding a language, for Dummett, is a kind of highly com-
plex practical ability, a practical ability plus knowledge. Here 
knowledge is introduced merely to reflect the very nature of such 
ability. The aim of a meaning-theory, as (i) states, is to give a theo-
retical representation of this complex practical ability. This theo-
retical representation is expressed propositionally, but we should 
notice that, according to Dummett, it is merely an expedient with-
out absurdity: 
. . . the idea was that we can describe the articulation of this 
highly complex practical ability-the ability to speak a particular 
language-by representing it as a possible object of proposi-
tional knowledge, while acknowledging that it is in fact not prepo-
sitional or theoretical, but practical, knowledge. The idea is not 
absurd in itself.. .'6 
The rationale that the mode of linguistic knowledge is non-propo-
sitional lies in the argument from dilemma: a speaker's knowl-
edge of a meaning-theory cannot be explicit, otherwise the ex-
planation of mastery of a language is either circular viciously or 
regressive ad infinitum. But this argument does not imply that 
the content or object of the knowledge-a meaning-theory-can-
not be expressed propositionally. Moreover, an articulated mean-
ing-theory assists a meaning theorist in analyzing and theorizing a 
speaker's linguistic competence; just like in describing "playing a 
musical instrument, we may need to enunciate some propositions 
as a preparation for saying what that ability involves doing."17 
This is why Dummett proposes that "we are analyzing a complex 
of practical abilities by feigning to attribute to one who has these 
abilities a knowledge of [an articulated structure of proposi-
tions]."18 Here I shall formulate Dummett's notion of the relation 
between understanding a language L and knowing a meaning-
theory for L as an equation: U(Z,) = K(T(L)), where T is a vari-
able, or a schema for a correct, articulated, theory of meaning to 
substitute. 
Let us turn to (ii). Several philosophers19 have interpreted 
Dummett's notion of knowledge of language as propositionally con-
structed. However, as we have seen, Dummett never character-
izes a speaker's knowledge of language as "propositional know-
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ledge"; further, were it the case, it would contradict the conclusion 
drawn from the argument from dilemma. 
For Dummett, a speaker's knowledge of language could have 
nothing to do with propositional knowledge; a speaker's having a 
language is merely constituted by his being capable of manifesting 
or using that language. However, the aim of a theory of meaning in 
general is not to faithfully record what a speaker said or behaved, 
but to render his linguistic behaviour intelligible.™ One pos-
sible way to achieve this aim is to construct an articulated system-
atizing (usually compositional) meaning-theory, to represent a 
speaker's ability to speak a language as if he possesses or knows 
the theory. The main work for a meaning theorist then is to ex-
pound the form and content of a meaning-theory which can best 
represent a speaker's linguistic behaviour and competence. We 
can merely treat a speaker's seeming possession of a meaning-
theory as theoretically ad hoc and harmless. 
One may rejoin that such "seeming possession" is not a genu-
ine possession, and hence it is possible that a speaker does not 
really have a particular theory that meaning theorists ascribe to 
him. However, this rejoinder, if correct, merely states that a speaker 
may have no theory for a language; the rejoinder does not deny 
that the speaker possesses certain linguistic knowledge. That 
is, the rejoinder merely forces us to blank our aforementioned equa-
tion as follows: U(L) = K(?(Z)). 
Further, the rejoinder is uninteresting. For even though we ad-
mit that a speaker's implicit knowledge of a meaning-theory is 
merely seemingly possessed, the theory ascribed to the speaker 
cannot be arbitrary,21 that is, some theories cannot be a solution to 
the equation U(L) = K(T(L)). For instance, when we substitute a 
truth-conditional meaning-theory, T1C, for T, to get a statement U(Z) 
= K(!rTC(Z,)), then, from Dummett's point of view, the statement is 
false. It is because for Dummett U(L) '" K(7TC(L)), i.e., TJC does 
not and cannot explain how a speaker understands a language. At 
any rate, the point is that there is still an interesting, nontrivial, work 
for a theory of meaning to achieve, that is, to give a solution to the 
equation \J(L) = K(J(Z)), rather than blank it as V(L) = K(?(Z,)). 
With the equation U(I) = K(J(I)) in hand, we can test the 
correctness of each meaning-theory (i.e., theoretical representa-
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tion of a speaker's complex practical ability) by substituting it for T 
in the right-hand side of the equation. It is obvious that the left-
hand side, a speaker's understanding of a language, can be treated 
as a checkpoint. The question that whether a meaning-theory rep-
resents (or misrepresents) a speaker's knowledge of a language 
can be pursued by inquiring into whether the theory mirrors the 
speaker's understanding of the language. It is Dummett's method-
ology for determining a meaning-theory. 
Readers soon notice that Dummett's attitude towards implicit 
knowledge is instrumental. The aim of ascribing knowledge of a 
systematic meaning-theory to speakers, for Dummett, is to render 
linguistic behaviour intelligible. His constraints on the notion of lin-
guistic knowledge-knowledge of language cannot be (a) pure prac-
tical and (b) unconscious-restrict him in giving a more psychologi-
cally realistic account of linguistic knowledge. Without the con-
straint (a), a speaker's implicit knowledge of semantic axioms could 
be construed by the speaker's behavioural dispositions (such as 
Evans's dispositional construal of tacit knowledge).22 Without (b), 
the knowledge can be construed by the speaker's subdoxastic 
mental processing (such as Peacocke's computationalist construal 
of tacit knowledge).23 Either Evans's dispositional construal or 
Peacocke's psychologically realistic construal can tell us how im-
plicit knowledge is actually used. On the contrary, Dummett's 
construal cannot. However, it seems that Dummett has never in-
tended to liberate his notion of implicit knowledge from the con-
straints, or quitted pursuing what knowledge of language consists 
in. He merely expressed his faith that linguistic competence re-
quires linguistic knowledge, but despaired of figuring it out: "I be-
lieve it to be a mistake to think that a full account of linguistic 
understanding has been provided when its manifestations in the 
use of language have been described,... for that in effect reduces 
mastery of a language to possession of a practical ability: . . . I 
believe it to be more than that, but something exceedingly difficult 
to describe."24 
So far I have argued that Dummett does not solve the deliv-
ery problem. Further, he cannot solve the problem, if he refuses to 
adopt a psychologistic approach. But I do not suggest Dummett to 
adopt these alternative approaches. Three reasons. First, if we 
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adopt a psychologist approach, then we have to abandon the ratio-
nality requirement, which is well defended by philosophers.25 Sec-
ond, the psychologically realistic construals of tacit knowledge pro-
posed by Peacocke and Davies respectively are based upon a com-
putational theory of cognition, which has its own problems and 
troubles.26 Third, the delivery problem should not be a problem; it 
can be dissolved. To argue this, in what follows I shall introduce 
Davidson's view about linguistic knowledge. 
Davidson's View about Linguistic Knowledge 
From an implicit or tacit knowledge theorist's point of view, a 
substantial account of what speakers' knowledge consists in can 
be given through studying the transmission-epistemic, cognitive, or 
whatever-between a speaker's knowledge of a language's mean-
ing-theory and his knowledge of the meanings of utterances in that 
language. We can, as Wright puts it, "think of actual speakers as 
equipped with the information codified in the axioms of a success-
ful Davidsonian theory, and as prone to deploy that information in 
ways reflected by the derivations of meaning-delivering theorems 
afforded by the theory."27 However, Davidson has never accepted 
such a proposal. He reminds us that: 
You will notice that I do not speak of implicit knowledge here or 
elsewhere: the point is not that speaker or hearer has a theory, 
but that they speak and understand in accord with a theory-a 
theory that is needed only when we want to describe their abili-
ties and performance.28 
Davidson's concern about implicit knowledge is similar to John 
Foster's. Foster wondered, "[i]s it not unnatural, even incoherent, 
to ascribe states of knowledge to which the subject himself has 
no conscious access?"29 Of course, such an inquiry is based upon 
a commonsensical, or epistemic-internalist, notion of knowledge, 
and has been demystified more or less by tacit knowledge theo-
rists' efforts to clarify the notion "tacit knowledge."30 But Foster 
did not suggest that theorists conquer the difficulty within the 
programme of tacit knowledge meaning-theory. His suggestion was 
far more radical: "Rather than ask for a statement of the know-
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ledge implicit in linguistic competence, let us ask for the state-
ment of a theory whose knowledge would suffice for such com-
petence."31 Davidson gladly and explicitly accepted such a pro-
posal.3 2 
To repeat: Davidson evades the issue concerning actual 
speakers' knowledge, especially their "knowledge of a meaning-
theory for a natural language" in explaining linguistic competence 
by, first, reading the claim "a speaker/interpreter has knowledge 
of a meaning theory for a natural language" literally (that is, he 
understands it as stating that the speaker or interpreter has propo-
sitional knowledge of a meaning theory), and then rejecting the 
very claim by its being incompatible with the fact that "no one 
now has explicit knowledge of a fully satisfactory theory for in-
terpreting the speakers of any natural language."33 It is true that 
no actual speaker has any theoretical or propositional knowledge 
of a formal meaning-theory for the language he or she speaks, 
but it is controversial whether we should read the claim literally 
as Davidson did. But let us just assume Davidson's attitude to-
wards the role of linguistic knowledge in a meaning-theory is cor-
rect; i.e., "All we should require of a theory of truth for a speaker 
is that it be such that, if an interpreter had explicit propositional 
knowledge of the theory, he would know the truth conditions of 
utterances of the speaker."34 
The next question to consider is whether a speaker's know-
ledge of formal semantics for a language, whether explicit or 
implicit, is a necessary and sufficient condition for him to mas-
ter the language. Let us imagine a speech community which I 
shall call the a-community. All members of the a-community 
speak English, and can consciously access the information-pro-
cessing between a meaning-theory for English and the under-
standing of utterances. That is, every oc-speaker has explicit, 
theoretical, or propositional knowledge of a meaning-theory for 
English, and is capable of articulating the derivation process of 
the meaning-theory when asked to explain how he knows the 
meanings of sentences uttered by other a-speakers. In such a 
scenario we ask whether an cc-speaker's knowledge of the 
meaning-theory is a necessary and sufficient condition for him 
to master English. 
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To answer the question I shall make use of Davidson's "A 
Nice Derangement of Epitaphs." In that paper Davidson lists three 
principles concerning "first meaning" (roughly speaking, "literal 
meaning"35), namely that it is systematic, shared, and governed by 
learn conventions or regularities.36 Let me rephrase them. It is 
wildly held in the philosophy of language that to have a language L 
is to possess knowledge of the contents of a meaning-theory for L. 
This is because possessing a meaning-theory for i explains how it 
is possible for a speaker to be capable of (i) learning L, (ii) know-
ing infinite or novel utterances of £, and (iii) successfully commu-
nicating with other L-speakers. 
A Davidsonian meaning-theory's compositionality addresses 
the first two issues in that a compositional meaning-theory is re-
cursive and has a finite base. These features have to do with a 
human being's finiteness in his or her knowledge store and infi-
nite capability for linguistic understanding. The concept of 
compositionality shows how first meaning is systematic (or struc-
tural): a speaker's knowledge of the first meaning of an utterance 
is structurally derived from his implicit knowledge of a denotation 
axiom for the proper name, a satisfaction axiom for the monadic 
predicate in the utterance, and a combination rule. 
To answer (iii), a meaning-theory for L (or to put it mildly, as 
Davidson did, a "systematic method of interpretation") has to be 
shared by each member in a conversation: "The sharing comes to 
this: the interpreter uses his theory to understand the speaker; the 
speaker uses the same (or an equivalent) theory to guide his 
speech."37 Merely to have a certain meaning-theory for L does 
not guarantee successful communication. It is possible that a natu-
ral language L might have two different, incompatible, meaning-
theories, say, Mx and Mr For the same sentence sx in L, Mx de-
rives the theorem " J , is true iff /?,", while M2 "sl is true iff p 2 . " 
And the case can be generalized to all sentences in L. When two 
(so-called) L-speakers, who possess Mx and M2 respectively, be-
gin to talk to each other, we will find how difficult it will be for them 
to "communicate." In addition, the speakers will doubt whether 
they are speaking the same language though they are both familiar 
with the sounds issuing from their mouths. Thus, to communicate 
successfully there seems to be a requirement that the meaning-
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theory possessed by each party be the same or extentionally equiva-
lent (i.e., be capable of deriving the same set of semantic theo-
rems). Since a meaning-theory or theory of interpretation is shared 
by both speaker and hearer, their knowledge of such theory may 
then be called conventions. What a speaker or hearer knows is 
not merely a meaning-theory, but a shared theory. 
Let us turn back to our thought experiment. Is an oc-speaker's 
knowledge of a (conventionalized) meaning-theory a necessary 
and sufficient condition for him to master a language? Here to 
master a language is the same thing as being able to interpret or 
communicate with others, since a speaker's linguistic competence, 
an ability to know meanings of every (actual or potential) sen-
tence of a language, can be rephrased as being able to inter-
pret every (actual or potential) sentence uttered by a speaker 
of that language. So the original question can be rephrased as 
well: Is an a-speaker's knowledge of a (conventionalized) mean-
ing-theory a necessary and sufficient condition for him to inter-
pret or communicate with another a-speaker? I admit that a 
shared meaning-theory does assist an interpreter in understand-
ing his speaker's utterances, but this does not mean that a shared 
theory is a condition for interpretation. In this regard, Davidson 
invited us to consider the phenomenon of malapropism. When Mrs. 
Malaprop uttered the sentence "That is a nice derangement of 
epitaphs", an interpreter (as an a-speaker) should derive the fol-
lowing theorem: 
(Th) "That is a nice derangement of epitaphs" is-true-in-English iff 
That is a nice derangement of epitaphs. 
to interpret her utterance. But it is possible that the interpreter uses 
this alternate "theorem": 
(Th*) "That is a nice derangement of epitaphs" is-true-in-English 
iff That is a nice arrangement of epithets. 
The interpreter is supposed to take (Th) to interpret Mrs. Malaprop, 
for, in this case, (Th) is the only information that the meaning-
theory for English can proffer. But then the interpreter fails to 
communicate with Mrs. Malaprop. As to (Th*), it is not derived 
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from the meaning-theory for English; strictly speaking, it is not 
derived at all. The interpreter could refuse to consider any theo-
rem that does not derive from the theory for English, including 
(Th*), and treat Mrs. Malaprop as irrational when he hears Mrs. 
Malaprop utter the sentence like "Sure, if I reprehend anything in 
this world, it is the use of my oracular tongue, and a nice derange-
ment of epitaphs." 
Or, the interpreter could take (Th*) and other "deviant theo-
rems" (in effect, again, they are not theorem at all) to interpret 
Mrs. Malaprop, and keep communicating with her. Most of time, 
malapropism can be understood; otherwise, the thing called mala-
propism would not be recognized as such. The problem is: what 
allows the interpreter to construe (Th*)? How does (Th*) spring 
to the interpreter's mind, if it is not derived? 
In such a situation the theory that the interpreter prepares in 
advance to interpret his speaker is called by Davidson the prior 
theory, and the theory that the interpreter does in fact use is called 
the passing theory. In the case of interpreting Mrs. Malaprop, 
(Th*) is the interpreter's passing theory. According to Davidson, 
a prior theory is not, and should not be, shared by interpreter and 
speaker;38 a shared passing theory is what is required for com-
munication. But this observation of successful communication does 
not imply that possessing a passing theory and the (modified) 
meaning-theory from which the passing theory is derived consti-
tutes a language-user's linguistic competence, an argument based 
on two reasons. First, when successfully communicating, an 
interpreter's and an interpretee's passing theories (and the mean-
ing-theory from which the passing theories are derived) "must, of 
course, coincide after an utterance has been made. . . . But un-
less they coincide in advance, the concepts of regularity and con-
vention have no definite purchase."39 Second, though an inter-
preter, in order to interpret a particular speaker, can modify his 
(prior) meaning-theory by accommodating the passing theories, 
knowledge of such a modified meaning-theory, however, would 
be insufficient for the interpreter to interpret another idiosyncratic 
speaker. So, what is our linguistic ability? For Davidson, a 
speaker's linguistic competence is his ability to converge on passing 
theories, and "there are no rules for arriving at passing theories, 
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no rules in any strict sense, as opposed to rough maxims and meth-
odological generalities." 4 0 There is much to be said about 
Davidson's (new) notion of linguistic competence. But I will not 
elaborate it further. Davidson's criticism of orthodox notions of 
linguistic competence and communication would be enough for me 
to address my point. Knowledge of a shared prior theory is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for understanding a speaker, neither 
is knowledge of the formal semantical theory that derives the prior 
theory. Knowledge of a conventionalized meaning-theory is not 
sufficient for understanding a speaker, since it is possible that an 
interpreter possesses the very knowledge (e.g., knowledge of the 
meaning-theory for English) while he still does not understand a 
speaker's utterances (e.g., Mrs. Malaprop's utterance "That is a 
nice derangement of epitaphs"). Further, sharing knowledge of a 
meaning-theory in advance, i.e., having conventions or regulari-
ties, is not necessary for understanding a speaker, since an inter-
preter is capable of understanding or interpreting a speaker with-
out conventions or sharing knowledge of the meaning-theory with 
his interpreter (i.e., an interpreter is capable of assigning mean-
ings, say, arrangement and epithet to the words "derangement" 
and "epitaph" respectively, the very assignment is different from 
one the interpreter possesses in advance).41 
If Davidson's thesis is correct, then implicit or tacit know-
ledge meaning-theorists' attempts to solve the delivery problem 
seem to be misguided. Recall our cc-speaker, who knows con-
sciously a meaning-theory for a language and all the delivery 
process between the meaning-theory and the interpretation of ut-
terances of his speaker. The condition for the a-speaker to com-
municate with others, if the meaning-theoretic account is right, 
would have to be good luck: all the speakers that he intends to 
interpret or understand must have the same knowledge and abil-
ity as he. But actually, the a-speaker can interpret and under-
stand those who did not prepare the same knowledge and ability. 
(This point can be defended further by the possibility of radical 
interpretation.) Thus, if linguistic competence does not consist in 
speakers' knowledge of formal semantics, the delivery problem 
is accordingly pseudo; the problem presupposes a false account 
of linguistic competence. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have shown why Dummett pursues the notion 
of implicit knowledge (§1), and why he does not, and cannot, give 
an account of how implicit knowledge is actually used (§2). In 
§3 I argue further, via Davidson's thesis, that Dummett's attempt 
to solve the delivery problem is misguided, since the problem pre-
supposes a false notion of linguistic competence, and then is 
pseudo. To pursue the delivery problem cannot cast any theoreti-
cal light on the notions of linguistic competence and communica-
tion. 
Since Davidson published "A Nice Derangement", it has been 
discussed from a variety of points of view in a number of journal 
articles (and book chapters, and dissertations). In my judgement, 
"A Nice Derangement" encapsulates Davidson's later philosophy 
of language,42 including his views on the nature of linguistic com-
petence, linguistic communication, and language, and the task of a 
theory of meaning. Most of the commentators of "A Nice De-
rangement" dedicate themselves to criticism (though a few ex-
press support).43 For example, several philosophers suspect that 
Davidson's thesis in "A Nice Derangement" conflicts with his 
programme of truth-conditional semantics proposed in Inquiries 
into Truth and Interpretation. They see a conflict between two 
Davidsons: a Tarskian Davidson and a Wittgensteinian Davidson.44 
But this supposed issue would not undermine my analysis above 
unless it has been proven or well-argued that the conflict does 
exist and is irreconcilable, and further, that the Tarskian Davidson 
is correct.45 
There is no suggestion in this paper that Dummett had better 
abandon either his constraints on the notion of linguistic know-
ledge, or his instrumental construal of knowledge of language. What 
I want do is to push him to realize that the delivery problem is not a 
genuine problem and then not a threat to his semantic programme. 
In pursuing a formal semantic theory, I suggest Dummett to adopt 
Foster's and Davidson's attitude to the role of linguistic know-
ledge in a theory of meaning. In this setting, Dummett's 
verificationist meaning-theory and Davidson's truth-conditional 
meaning-theory are then commensurable.46 
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Notes 
1 A precise formulation of the account is that linguistic competence 
requires knowledge of a compositional meaning-theory. The reason I 
leave out the modifier in the main text is that the notions "meaning-
theory" and "formal semantics" mentioned in this paper must be compo-
sitional, otherwise it cannot account for the features of a human speaker 
(i.e., a speaker is "finite" in his knowledge store, and "infinite" in his 
linguistic understanding). The meaning-theoretic account of linguistic 
competence can be transformed into an account of linguistic communi-
cation, once we treat a language-user's linguistic competence to under-
stand every actual and potential sentences in a particular language as 
the same thing as his communicative competence to understand every 
actual and potential utterances made by a sincere speaker of that particu-
lar language. And if so, the meaning-theory that the language-user pos-
sesses has to meet further constraint beyond compositionality, that is, 
the conventionality constraint: both parties of the communication share 
the same compositional meaning-theory prepared in advance. So, the 
complete formulation of the meaning-theoretic account of linguistic (or 
communicative) competence is this: linguistic competence and commu-
nication requires knowledge of a conventionalized meaning-theory. See 
§3 for further discussion. 
2 Higginbotham 1995:130 and fh.23. 
3 Dummett 1993a: 161. 
"Dummett 1993b:x; italics mine. See also Dummett 1978 (104-5), 1991 
(88-92), and 1993a (158). 
5 Dummett 1978:96. 
6 Dummett 1978:101. 
7 Cf. "Explicit knowledge is manifested by the ability to state the 
content of the knowledge" (Dummett 1978:101). 
8 See e.g., Dummett 1978 (101), and 1991 (104). 
9 Dum-mett 1975:217. 
1 0 Wright 1991:135. 
" Peacocke 1986; Davies 1987. 
1 2 Dummett 1991:92. 
1 3 See, for example, Dummett 1981a and 1989, where his target is 
Chomsky's notion of knowledge of language. I think Dummett's argu-
ments also suit to Peacocke's (1986) and Davies's (1987) computationalist 
construals of tacit knowledge. 
1 4 Dummett 1976:36. 
1 5 Dummett 1991:105. 
1 6 Dummett 1993a: 159-60. 
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1 7 Dummett 1993a: 160. 
1 8 Dummett 1991:105. 
1 9 See, for example, Baker & Hacker 1984 (239-40), Devitt 1997 (270-5), 
and Miller 1997 (147-52). 
2 0 Dummett 1981b:681-2. 
2 1 Cf. "[W]e are analyzing a complex of practical abilities by feigning 
to attribute to one how has these abilities a knowledge of the theory. The 
analysis will fail... if it does not at the same time explain the method of 
representation, by saying how the knowledge of each proposition of the 
theory is manifested" (Dummett 1991:105). 
2 2 Evans 1981. 
"Peacocke 1986. See also Davies 1987. 
2 4 Dummett 1993a: 161. 
2 5 Such as Wright 1986, Lepore 1997, and Weiss 2003. 
2 6 See, in particular, Searle 1997, and McDowell 1994. 
2 7 Wright 1986:206; italics mine. 
2 8 Davidson 1994:113. 
2 9 Foster 1976:2. 
3 0 See especially Davies 1989. 
3 1 Foster 1976:2. 
3 2 See Davidson 1976. Dummett clearly detects Davidson's position: 
"In [Davidson's] earlier essays, he was disposed to attribute to actual 
speakers an implicit knowledge of a correct meaning-theory for their lan-
guage. In later writings, he forswore this attribution, claiming only that 
the meaning-theory constituted a body of knowledge whose possession 
by a subject would enable him to speak the language" (Dummett 1991:103). 
3 3 Davidson 1986:96. 
3 4 Davidson 1990:312. 
3 5 Cf. "[First meaning] corresponds roughly to what is sometimes 
called literal meaning, but since this latter phrase has associations I do 
not want I have coined my own jargon" (Davidson 1993:173). 
3 6 Davidson 1986:93. 
"Davidson 1986:96. 
3 8 Davidson 1986:103-4. 
"Davidson 1984:278. 
4 0 Davidson 1986:107. 
4 1 As to the thesis of "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," see espe-
cially Davidson 1994,1998, and 1999. 
4 2 See in particular Davidson 1984,1989,1993, and 1994. 
4 3 For example, Ramberg 1989. 
4 4 See especially Bar-On & Risjord 1992, Pereda 1998, and Rorty 1998. 
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4 5 With respect to Davidson's response to the conflict, see Davidson 
1998 and 1999. 
4 6 1 am grateful to the Fellowship Program of Academic Sinica for its 
financial support, and to Cheng-hung Lin, Wan-chuan Fang, and Norman 
Teng for their helpful comments. 
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